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Abstract
The Asian crisis started on July 2, 1997 and caused turmoil in developed as well as emerging
international stock markets. The objective of this paper is to analyse the movements and dynamic
relationships among stock markets, together with their implications for information flows. We
use the Morgan Stanley National and International Indexes (MSCI). These indexes refer to four
geographic areas (Asia, Europe, North America and Latin America) for two homogeneous and
non-overlapping time intervals. The econometric techniques used in this paper include the
cointegration test, vector autoregression analysis, forecast error variance decomposition  and
impulse-response relationships. Our results show that: i) there are no multivariate cointegration
relationships across markets, ii) the leadership role played by the U.S. became stronger after the
crisis, iii) the response of Asian markets to external markets is more relevant than vice versa,
especially after the crisis, iv) the degree of integration, in Phylaktis (1999) sense, between Asian
and the rest of the international stock markets has increased after the crisis and, finally, v) the
contagion effect determines significantly the dynamic relationships between international stock
markets.
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Has 1997 Asian Crisis increased Information Flows between International Markets?
1. Introduction
The crisis began with five stock markets: Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and South
Korea and even spread to seemingly more solid economies from the macroeconomic point of
view. The reasons could be summarised as: i) the appreciation of the dollar against the yen
between 1995 and 1997 which weakened the rest-of-the world sector of several Asian countries,
ii) the high degree of influence that the internal crisis of one country can cause on the
fundamental variables of another, via commercial relationships, or via the linkage of capital
markets, and iii) the downward revision of Asian economic fundamental variables made by
international creditors.
According to the Organisation for Cooperation and Economic Development (OCED, 1998), the
World Bank (1998), and the International Monetary Fund (Adams et al., 1998), there are two
singularities that differentiate this crisis from those that have taken place in other developing
countries especially the debt crisis of the 80´s and the 1994 Mexican crisis. First, the largest
turbulence was caused by financial decisions that were adopted in the private sector (strongly
indebted short-term), while public debt did not have a significant responsibility, because most
Asian countries had fiscal surpluses. Second, the international context had been globally
favourable, with a solid and stable growth of production and trade in the major western
economies, together with historically low interest rates that facilitated indebtedness at a low cost.
According to the IMF (1998), the vulnerability of these countries was caused by the weakness of
their financial sectors, together with the lack of diligence and speed in adopting macroeconomic
policies that could enable an exit from the crisis with the smallest possible cost. What began as an- 2 -
exchange crisis in one country —Thailand— finished causing a recession in most Southeast
Asian nations, and global financial uncertainty that eventually affected the rest of the world.
The process of financial liberalisation is one of the main causes of the Asian crisis. The process
was not correctly applied and caused a distortion in the allocation of resources and a weakness in
the financial system. The marked reduction in interest rates in the industrialised world,
contributed decisively to a smaller aversion to risk and a movement of investor preferences
towards financial assets in emerging economies. The result was short-term saturation of foreign
capital causing a speculative bubble in Asian real estate and stock markets that pulled along a
relatively undeveloped banking system. The resulting market crisis and withdrawal of foreign
capital caused massive devaluation and the crash of the economic model.
In short, efforts to support the currency in Thailand in the first semester of 1997 —which
included, interest rate increases (18% in June 1997, compared to 12% in January) and restrictions
on foreign speculation— were fruitless. This was because Thai companies, trying to protect
themselves from the exchange rate risk, paid off foreign debt and then carried out various
hedging operations to reduce their exposure in the foreign exchange market (Miller, 1998). On
July, 2 1997, after having spent 8,700 million dollars in reserves to support the currency, the Thai
Central Bank set the exchange rate free and, at the end of the same year, the bhat had depreciated
93% compared to June 1997.
The forced flotation of the bhat, with regard to the dollar, put the exchange rates of other
countries on trial. The secondary effects were quickly felt in Indonesia, Malaysia and the
Philippines. Measures adopted to reduce liquidity in Indonesia were unable to brake the growing
pressures on the foreign exchange market and the authorities floated the rupiah by the middle of- 3 -
August. The situation degraded notably over the two following months, and the effects spread to
other countries like Hong Kong and Japan.
The Hong Kong dollar was subjected to strong pressures and therefore, interest rates rose steeply in
October. This was followed by a sharp decrease in the stock market, causing a domino effect in
most world stock markets1; as well as an increase in pressure on the currencies of developing
countries. In South Korea, the downward pressure on the won intensified at the end of October,
after the attack on the Hong Kong dollar.
By way of synthesis, the importance of this crisis does not just reside in the structural nature of
the problems caused, but in the easy spread inside and outside the region. The relatively quick
contamination of other economies, distant geographically and economically from the epicentre of
the convulsion, could be a result of the globalisation of world financial markets. This
globalisation has had positive effects by allowing a better allocation of resources, the effective
exploitation of comparative advantage, and an increase in growth rates. However, the advantages
may be put into question if globalisation reveals a long series of deficiencies in financial markets.2
This paper studies the relationships between those Southeast Asian markets most affected by the
crisis of 1997  (Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Hong Kong and Japan)
and the markets of three different geographical areas (Europe, North America and Latin
America). We attempt to verify if interdependence has increased among the markets as a
                                                     
1 On 27 and 28 October 1997 the Hong Kong MCI index fell 5.33% and 12.87%. The variations in the same indexes
for Spain, Eurozone, and the USA were: on the 27th: -3.37%, -2.55% and -6.66%; and on the 28th: -2.67%, +4.83%
and -3.57%, respectively.
2 For a more detailing see Bustelo (2000) and Lane et al. (1999).- 4 -
response to the globalisation process over recent years and to determine possible relationships of
leadership, contagion effects, and strategies of international portfolio diversification. We also
check if the crisis has altered the degree of integration between the markets. Information flows is
also studied in the international stock markets in the face of abrupt changes in behaviour, and we
examine if these events have caused structural or economic trend changes. To achieve these
objectives, the methodology of vector autoregressive models (VAR) is applied, as proposed by
Sims (1980); as well as two complementary elements: forecast error variance decomposition
(FEVD) and impulse-response function (IRF).
This paper includes novelties compared with previous studies on market crises: i) we use the
Morgan Stanley homogeneous local and supra-national indexes (MSCI), ii) considered markets
represent four different geographical areas (Asia, Europe, North America and Latin America) as
well as developed and emerging markets, iii) the analysis period, 1995-2000, gives us a wide
sample, both before and after the Asian crisis, without considering exclusively the crisis period
(July to October 1997).
This paper is structured as follows: section 2 is devoted to a bibliographical revision of the main
works that analyse market crises. Section 3 describes the sample analysed and the methodology.
Section 4 presents an analysis of the series. Section 5 analyses the short and long-term
relationships among the markets and section 6 studies the Impulse-Response Function (IRF) and
the Forecasting Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD). Finally, section 7 summarises the main
conclusions.- 5 -
2. Bibliographical revision
First, those papers that analysed the effect of the 1987 crash on the stock markets are reviewed.
Malliaris and Urrutia (1991) examined causality among the daily indexes of the four main stock
markets during several months around the crash of 1987. They concluded that the number of the
cointegration relationships diminished after the crash. The same authors repeated their work of
the previous year, but examining six markets with a smaller sample period (Malliaris and Urrutia,
1992). The results revealed that a contemporary causality existed in two directions in October
1987, indicating that the crash began simultaneously in all the countries.
Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993) studied the relationships between the biggest five world stock
markets in the period 1980-1990, before and after the 1987 crash. They worked with the
cointegration methodology proposed by Engle and Granger (1987). For the whole sample, they
observed that the markets of Japan, United Kingdom and France are cointegration with the
American market, however, they did not observe cointegration relationships between the
European markets and Japan. They did not detected long run relationships before the crash, yet
detect such relationships after the crash and equally for the whole period. In the post-crash
period, causality was shown in one direction, from USA towards Europe. The degree of
international integration has increased except in the case of Japan. Rogers (1994) examined the
relationships between the stock markets of Southeast Asian and America in the period 1986-
1990. The principal objective was to examine the effect of entrance barriers in the transmission
of stock market shocks. His results indicate that, in markets without entrance barriers, the crash
of 1987 caused a substantial increase in volatility and co-movement of the markets, although this
effect was temporary and normality returned after the crisis.- 6 -
Cashin et al. (1995), used the cointegration methodology of Johansen (1988) to determine stock
markets with similar behaviour and analysed the contagion effect using the error correction
model. The results of the cointegration test showed an increase in the integration of emerging
markets during the 90´s. However, the industrialised markets were integrated from the beginning
of the same period. Lastly, they studied contagion after local and global shocks and detected that
the local shocks disappear in a few weeks, while the global shocks require several months before
returns recover to equilibrium. Masih and Masih (1997) demonstrated how cointegration
techniques, error correction models, and techniques of variance decomposition, can be used to
determine the relationships among the six main international stock markets over the period 1979-
1987. They verified that the American market has not been affected in its role as leader by the
market crash of 1987, and that the German and British markets increased their dependence on
other markets after the crash.
Kanas (1998) studied the cointegration relationships between the USA and the six main
European markets during the period 1983-1996. The results revealed that none of the markets
are cointegration in any of the examined periods. Kanas concluded by affirming that the absence
of relationships of long-term equilibrium between the USA and the six main European markets
implies that there are long-term potential benefits to be obtained by reducing the risk derived
from the international diversification of US shares and of the rest of the European markets.
Soydemir (2000) analyse the transmission mechanism of movements in stock markets, for the
period 1988-1994 and in both developed (Europe and USA) and emerging (Latin America)
markets. The methodology consists in the analysis of the impulse-response function and forecast
error variance decomposition. Soydemir concludes that fundamentals, such as imports and
exports, play a decisive role, and so rejects the existence of a contagion effect.- 7 -
Finally, various papers have analysed the effect of the Asian crisis. Tan (1998) analysed eight
Southeast Asian stock markets during the period 1995-1998 and verified the contagion effect
during the Asian financial crisis by using an error correction model, impulse-response function
and Forecast Error Variance Decomposition. Baig and Goldfajn (1999) compared contagion
among the markets most involved in the Asian crisis (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea and
the Philippines) during the period 1995-1998. They concluded that during periods of uncertainty,
the markets tend to move together; and that shocks generated in one market are quickly
transmitted to other markets and they discarded fundamental variables as decisive elements in the
movement of markets and favour the contagion effect. Lastly, Masih and Masih (1999) studied
dynamic causality between eight daily market indexes (four developed markets and four Asians)
and quantified the dynamic interdependence between them. Their results indicate that the USA is
the market leader, in both the short and long-term. At a regional level, Hong Kong is the market
leader and, finally, the fluctuations of the Asian stock markets are explained consistently with the
hypothesis of contagion effect, the hypothesis being more true for the regional markets, than for
the developed markets.
3 .- Data and Methodology
The data used refers to MSCI share price indexes. These indexes are expressed in dollars3, and
have been designed with a common base for all countries and regions. The MSCI index is
calculated using the Laspeyres formula and represents approximately 60% of the market
capitalisation of the markets. The indexes are adjusted following changes in company capital
structure so facilitating comparison over time.
                                                     
3 The perspective of an American investor is adopted. This allows us to eliminate noise in the stock market
fluctuations caused by currency changes.- 8 -
The data used refers to the daily closing rates of the MSCI share indexes for the stock markets of
four different geographical areas: Asia (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, South Korea,
Hong Kong and Japan); Europe: UK and Eurozone (Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Finland,
France, Holland, Ireland, Italy and Portugal); North America (United States of America) and
Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela)4. The objective
with the selection of these indexes is to globally analyse the different trading hours of the big
three stock market areas.5
The sample interval covers the period from January 4, 1995 to May 15, 2000. Two sub-periods
are examined: one from January 4, 1995 through July 1, 1997 before the Asian crisis and termed
Precrash (653 observations). The other is termed Postcrash and runs from the end of the crisis
-November 1, 1997- until the end of the period -May 15, 2000- (662 observations).
Starting from these data, the steps followed to determine the dynamic relationship among the
analysed stock markets are: firstly, a descriptive analysis of the series; secondly, a comparison of
stationarity; thirdly, the existence of long-term equilibrium relationships and short-term causality
is analysed, and lastly; a multivariate dynamic analysis is performed using the impulse-response
function and the forecast error variance decomposition.
 4.- Analysis of series
Firstly, we analyse the variability degree of stock index series (Table 2). The quotient between the
annualised return and the annualised volatility of each market is considered as a relative measure
                                                     
4 Eurozone and Latinamerican series are supranational stock indices.
5 Table 1 shows the trading hours in local time and GMT (Greenwich Mean Time).- 9 -
of comparison6. It can be seen that the period after the crash is more variable and witnesses
significant setbacks in the returns.
In second place, the existence of unit roots has been tested with the purpose of identifying the
order of integrability of each stock index series. Some studies have established that when a unit
root and moving average are simultaneously present in the process, and the root is near to the
unit, then the traditional of Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Phillips and Perron (1988) tests, tend to
accept the null hypothesis of the existence of a unit root with excessive frequency. That is to say,
the null hypothesis is only rejected if strong evidence exists to the contrary. For this reason, the
test of Kwiatkowski et al (1992) - hereafter referred to as KPSS - has been used. In this test, the
null hypothesis is the stationarity of the series around a level or trend.7 The results obtained with
the KPSS test are presented in Table 3. In all the cases, and independently of the considered
interval, it is shown that the series are integrated of order one.
Lastly, according to Baig and Goldfajn (1999, p.169), if the stock markets are correlated
historically, a change in one market will be accompanied by a change in other markets. In this
sense, if during a period of crisis, the cross correlation do not suffer a significant variation, then
the markets are evolving according to their traditional relationship. On the other hand, if a
                                                     
6 Since the risk free interest rate of each market is not available it has not been possible to calculate Sharpe’s index,
which is a measure more adequate for comparing the evolution of the returns and risk variables.
7 The KPSS test proposes the following hypothesis. Let Xt , t=1,2,....T, be the series under study. Assuming that this
series can be decomposed in the sum of a deterministic trend t, a random walk rt = rt-1 + ut and a stationary error ε t ,
in this way: Xt = ξ  t + rt + ε t where ut ∼  iid (0, σ u
2). The null hypothesis of stationarity is established in the following
way, H0 : σ u
2 = 0 against the alternative hypothesis HA : σ u
2 >  0. Under the null hypothesis, Xt is stationary around
the trend, in the case that ξ  = 0, Xt is stationary around a level (r0).- 10 -
substantial change takes place in the cross correlation after the beginning of a crisis, this can be
interpreted as a contagion effect.
The results obtained with the analysis of cross correlation are presented in Table 4.8 The
following conclusions are obtained: i) correlation increases, in most of cases, when passing from
the period precrash to postcrash, ii) with regard to the rest of the markets, an increase in
contemporary correlation takes place, especially in the United Kingdom postcrash period, with
respect to the Asian countries, and lastly, iii) it is worth highlighting a notable increase in the
correlation of all Asian countries (except Indonesia), and especially for Thailand and South
Korea. These results show that an important change has taken place in the correlation level
between the Asian markets and the other ones. This allows the preliminary verification of the
existence of a contagion effect related to the Asian crisis.
5.-Long and short-term relationships
This section analyses the existence of cointegration relationships in three possible groups of
market indexes, in such a way that the relationships are independently determined among the
stock markets involved directly in the Asian crisis and each one of the others markets (Eurozone,
United Kingdom, United States and Latin America). The test used is that proposed by Johansen
(1988).
The concept of efficient market has been a focus for conflict in the literature regarding the
linkage of the international stock markets. An initial approach to this linkage was proposed by
Granger (1986, p.218). He argued that two series of prices of efficient markets cannot be
                                                     
8 The series are transformed in logarithmic differences.- 11 -
cointegrated, because if they were, then one could be used to help to predict the other; and this
contradicts the assumption of efficient markets in a weak sense.
Against this argument is a series of studies that differ regarding the direct relationship between
the existence of cointegration and the efficiency of markets. Specifically, Sephton and Larsen
(1991) studied the efficiency of foreign exchange markets by using cointegration analysis and they
called into question the direct relationship between the existence of cointegration relationships
and the absence of efficiency. They showed that the statement is excessively ambitious as the
results can differ substantially depending on the period and the sample frequency, and the
existence, or not, of structural changes. Even the method of estimating a cointegration
relationship can be important.
This theory has been defended by various authors who have studied cointegration relationships
among financial markets and have published conclusions about their relationships with market
efficiency. Dwyer and Wallace (1992), Lien (1996) and Masih and Masih (1999) argued that the
existence of cointegration does not necessarily contradict the notion of information efficiency of
Fama (1991), who defined an efficient market as that in which arbitrage opportunities do not
exist. These authors pointed out that although the existence of cointegration implies prediction, it
does not necessarily imply that arbitrage opportunities exist, because of the shortness of the
opportunity period or because transaction costs can eliminate the differences revealed by the
prediction.
In our opinion the incompatibility between cointegration and efficiency depends on the
definition of the latter. If it is assumed that efficient markets are those where asset prices are
unpredictable, then the existence of cointegration would imply inefficiency. However, this
incompatibility is resolved if an efficient market is defined as one without arbitrage opportunities.- 12 -
It is not enough to simply establish a direct relationship between the existence of cointegration
relationships and the inefficiency of the market. Instead, it is necessary to jointly consider other
additional factors in pricing models that allow us to determine the existence, or not, of abnormal
returns and in this way, to establish the efficiency, or not, of the markets.
The results of the cointegration test are presented in Table 5. A relationship of long-term
equilibrium is not detected in the four possible combinations. The acceptance of the non
cointegration hypothesis could be related with the high number of markets (eight) and the small
sample period (653/662 observations). However, the long-term non-existence of relationships
does not imply the non-existence of dynamic short-term relationships. The dynamic relationships
are later studied using vector autoregressive models (VAR). These models were proposed
originally by Sims (1980), with the objective of specifying models that faithfully reflect empirical
regularities and interactions among variables.
In a VAR model, a group of endogenous variables is considered, each of which is explained by
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where Z(t) is an 8 ×  1 column vector of rates of returns of stock markets; C is the deterministic
component; A(s) are an 8 ×  8 matrices of coefficients; m is the lag length, and e(t) is the 8 ×  1
innovation vector. By construction, e(t) is uncorrelated with all the past Z(s). According to Sims
(1980), this type of approach offers a greater degree of understanding of the macroeconomic
relationships than structural models can do, because the latter are based on inaccurate
identification restrictions.- 13 -
As a first step, the relationships of bivariant causality are studied, following the methodology of
Granger (1969), with the purpose of determining which variable causes, or best helps predict,
another variable. The estimation process is divided, in the same way as the previous cointegration
test, into four cases (Eurozone, United Kingdom, United States and Latin America, regarding the
Asian markets) and two sub-periods. In each VAR model, the optimal number of lags is
determined following the Schwarz information criteria. It is also jointly verified by using the
statistic Q of Ljung-Box that the residuals of the model do not show autocorrelation. Starting
from each VAR model, a short-term analysis of causality is carried out, so that by selecting any
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The independent terms of the two equations α   represent the returns spread for the period
of analysis; and the coefficients of the variables  φ    measure the direct effect of a change of
the return on the dependent variable. If the null hypothesis (H0) that  0 1 j = φ , for j=1,!, w, is
accepted, then we can affirm that X is not the cause of Y, in the sense of Granger. If the H0 that
0 2 i = φ , for i=1,!, g, is accepted then Y does not, in the sense of Granger, cause X. The test of
combined hypothesis is carried out with the F test. The results of the analysis of bivariant
causality are presented in Table 6. In the precrash period, it can be seen that the USA market
influences all the Asian countries in the short-term, except South Korea. A similar behaviour can
be seen in the Latin American market influenced, possibly, by the effect of sharing trading hours
with the United States. In the postcrash period, the results vary in a significant way, a relationship
of unidirectional causality being detected in the international stock markets towards the countries- 14 -
of Southeast Asia, except Malaysia. This fact is indicative of the greater dependence of the Asian
countries on flows of information coming from the main stock markets.
6.- Impulse-Response Functions and Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Although VAR models allow us to determine the existence of short-term causality in the sense of
Granger, they do not reveal anything about the dynamic properties of the system. Starting from
an estimation of the VAR pattern, Sims (1980) suggests that for studying these properties it
would be useful to operate with a moving average representation of the system; in which the
variables forming Yt appear as linear combinations of the forecast errors. We use the Wold
decomposition as a base and start from equation 1, which represents an autoregressive (AR)
multivariate structure. If the system is stationary, it can be expressed as a process of multivariate
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where Z(t) is a linear combination of current and past one-step-ahead forecast errors or
innovations. The i,jth  component of B(s) shows the response of the ith market in s periods after a
unit random shock in the jth market. The e(t) are serially uncorrelated by construction, although
they may be a contemporaneously correlated.
In order to capture “pure” responses, it is important to transfer the error terms. A lower
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The i,jth component of B(s)V in equation 4 represents the impulse response of the ith market in s
periods to a shock of one standard error in the jth market. The objective is to measure the- 15 -
response to shocks in each of the stock markets on the part of each of the remaining markets.
This analysis allows us to see if a significant influence exists among the markets and to measure
its persistence. Following Lütkepohl (1993), this technique can be interpreted as a type of
causality different from that of Granger, because the isolated impulses in a variable cause
responses in another variable and it is therefore possible to determine if the first variable causes
the second variable.
According to the Cholesky decomposition, the variable that first enters in the system operates as
the most exogenous, and its changes contemporaneously affect the remaining process variables.
In turn, the variable that is introduced in second place, is the second most exogenous and its
interferences rebound contemporarily on the other series, except the first, where it can only
impact in a delayed way. This behaviour model continues successively for all the components of
the model, and for this reason the order of the markets is important and can alter the dynamics
of the VAR system. Following the usual approach in the literature regarding VAR modelling, and
with the aim of avoiding the adoption of arbitrary decisions as much as possible, it is advisable
that certain theoretical considerations guide, a priori, the ordering of the variables.
The impulse response function (IRF) allows us to characterise the dynamic relationship among
the considered series of prices, since it detects the impact caused by the interaction of all the
variables. In this sense, these functions constitute a much more useful analytical tool than the
individual analysis of the parameters of the model, since they synthesise all the information
contained in these parameters (Lütkepohl and Reimers, 1992). As the IRF allows us to analyse
the speed with which a shock in a market is transmitted to the other markets, according to Eun
and Shim (1989) and Phylaktis (1999), this adjustment speed is an indicator of the degree of
market integration.- 16 -
In any case, for a better understanding of the existent dynamic linkages among the variables that
constitute the system, it is useful to analyse the IRF together with the forecast error variance
decomposition (FEVD). This allows us to value the relative importance of random changes in
the different components of the model in the variance of the forecast error of the returns.
In summary, the IRF reflects to what degree the shocks in the variables are transitory, or
persistent, in their impact on the stock market returns; while the analysis of the forecast error
variance decomposition allows to evaluate the relative importance of random changes in the
explanation of the forecast error variance decompositions of the return of other markets. In this
way, the technique helps to determine what percentage of forecast error variance decomposition
of the return of a market is attributable to the fluctuations of each one of the variables over
several time horizons (Lütkepohl and Reimers, 1992).
Starting from the VAR models previously estimated, we go on to analyse the IRF and FEVD. As
stated previously, the order of the series is important because it can change the interpretation of
the results. Therefore, an objective ordering approach has been adopted that is based on the
trading hours (GMT). In the case of the IRF, and with the aim of being able to compare the
graphic results, the scales have been homogenised and a time horizon of 10 days is fixed.
The results of the impulse response function are presented in graphs 1 to 8. As a synthesis, it can
be said that in the period of stability (precrash) the Asian markets respond significantly to unitary
shocks from the United States. In the period of turbulence (postcrash) the effects of an USA
shock grow on the Asian markets and, to a lesser degree, the UK and Eurozone markets. The
responsiveness of the Eurozone, UK and United States markets increases to shocks from Asian
markets. These results allow us to confirm that after the crisis, the degree of integration increased
in the direction suggested by Eun and Shim (1989) and Phylaktis (1999).- 17 -
The FEVD for the United States (Table 7) shows that, in spite of being considered a priori the
most endogenous, it is positioned as one of the most exogenous markets. This is because the
seven Asian markets in the precrash and postcrash periods can only account for 4% of the
variance of the total forecast error. It is worth highlighting that the explicative capacity of United
States in the rest of the markets is very significant during the precrash period. In the postcrash
period, being the most exogenous market, its explicative capacity increases in four markets.
During the precrash period, the United Kingdom (Table 8) shows an explicative level in its
variance of the forecast error, that is similar to that of the United States. In the postcrash period,
its explicative capacity is increased, as well as the percentage of its variance of forecast error that
can be explained by the other markets (from 5% to 21%). Eurozone during the precrash period
(Table 9) is a market with a reduced explicative capacity, never above 1%. In the postcrash
period, the explicative capacity of each market decreases. However, the hierarchy established in
the previous period is maintained. The Latin American market (Table 10) is less exogenous than
the United States in absolute value, but generally presents a similar behaviour regarding its
explicative capacity over the Asian markets (and vice versa) in both intervals.
In summary, the FEVD verifies the exogenous degree of the New York Stock Exchange, as seen
in the previous analysis, as well as its great explicative capacity over what happens in the Asian
markets. This reasoning can be expanded to the case of Latin America. The European markets
present a disparate behaviour because, while in the precrash period the United Kingdom is one
of the most exogenous, Eurozone is one of the least exogenous. However, in the postcrash
period their positions become closer and the results are similar. In most cases, the postcrash
period shows an increase in the percentage of the forecast error variance deviation of each
market that is explained by the other markets. According to Rogers (1994) and Tan (1998), this
indicates a generalisation after the crisis period of the global contagion effect.- 18 -
7. - Conclusions
The objective of this paper has been to analyse the effect of the Asian crisis on the short and
long-term relationships among the stock markets of Southeast Asia (Thailand, Philippines,
Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, Hong Kong and Japan) and a group of international stock
markets (United States, United Kingdom, Eurozone and Latin America) during the period 1995-
2000.
With regard to long-term equilibrium, relationships of multivariate cointegration are not detected
in the two analysed periods (precrash and postcrash) and in the four outlined cases. In
conclusion, the potential for long-run international diversification across these markets still exists,
and may be an effective investment strategy.
An analysis of short-term bivariant causality shows that the United States best predicts the Asian
markets, although after the crisis period, this role extends to other stock markets, and this
indicates greater linkage.
On the other hand, the forecasting error of variance decomposition shows the United States to
be the most exogenous market, before and after the crisis. It is also shown that in the postcrash
period, in most of the cases, the markets significantly reduce the explicative capacity of their own
forecast error deviation variance. In this way, a global contagion effect can be seen as the
consequence of turbulences generated in Southeast Asia.- 19 -
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Table 1. - Trading Hours
Stock market Local Time GMT Difference
South Korea 9:00-12:00 13:00-15:00 1:00-4:00 5:00-7:00 GMT+8
Philippines 9:30-12:00 1:30-4:00 GMT+8
Indonesia 9:30-12:00 and 13:30-16:00 2:30-5:00 6:30-9:00 GMT+7
Malaysia 9:30-12:30 and 14:30-17:00 1:30-4:30 6:30-9:00 GMT+8
Thailand 10:00-12:30 and 14:30-16:30 3:00-5:30 7:30-9:30 GMT+7
Hong Kong 10:00-12:30 and 14:30-16:30 2:00-4:30 6:30-8:30 GMT+8
Japan 9:00-11:00 and 12:30-15:00 0:00-2:00 3:30-6:00 GMT+9
United States 9:30 - 16:00 14:30-21:00 GMT-5
United Kingdom 9:30 - 17:30 9:30-17:30 GMT
Area Euro 8:30 - 17:45 7:30-16:45 GMT+1
Latin America 10:00-18:00
GMT: Greenwich Mean Time.- 23 -
Table 2. - Stock Market Variability
Annualised return and volatility considering the number of trading days




Eurozone United States Latin
America
1/1/1995-1/7/1997
Annual return -4% 21% 13% 5% -14% -6% -38% 18% 17% 26% 24%




turn -0.19 1.13 0.75 0.33 -0.66 -0.32 -1.52 1.66 1.70 2.36 1.62
1/11/97-15/5/2000
Annual return 12% 7% -36% 9% 26% -9% -11% 5% 19% 18% -1%




turn 0.41 0.19 -0.42 0.15 0.40 -0.27 -0.22 0.26 0.92 0.91 -0.02- 24 -
Table 3. - KPSS Stationarity Test
Levels First differences
4/1/1995 - 1/7/1997
η µ η τ η µ η τ
Japan 5.6793* 1.6827* 0.0796 0.0845
Hong Kong 11.6284* 0.6857* 0.0329 0.032
Indonesia 10.5771* 0.37* 0.0468 0.0413
Malaysia 8.6927* 0.5809* 0.1074 0.0659
South Korea 10.6403* 2.3258* 0.1052 0.093
Philippines 1.2266* 0.4584* 0.07 0.0701
Thailand 9.5815* 2.8988* 0.4589 0.0376
United Kingdom 11.8834* 1.9024* 0.0947 0.0366
 Eurozone 11.9024* 1.214* 0.119 0.0575
United States 12.4946* 0.8251* 0.0511 0.0511
Latin America 8.4012* 1.3322* 0.2939 0.0456
1/11/1997 - 15/5/2000
η µ η τ η µ η τ
Japan 10.9057* 2.4146* 0.1656 0.0675
Hong Kong 8.5911* 1.6147* 0.1192 0.0814
Indonesia 4.1513* 1.4566* 0.2378 0.1421
Malaysia 5.6682* 2.4889* 0.2635 0.0637
South Korea 11.6388* 1.2371* 0.1409 0.121
Philippines 1.9131* 1.0183* 0.1339 0.1048
Thailand 3.0886* 0.9449* 0.1009 0.0982
United Kingdom 4.8174* 0.6653* 0.1566 0.038
 Eurozone 8.5973* 0.9072* 0.1127 0.0673
United States 11.9341* 0.6298* 0.0603 0.025
Latin America 2.5482* 2.4610* 0.1584 0.0714
Note: KPSS test (Kwiatkowski et al, 1992) for the null hypothesis of stationarity regarding a model with constant
(η µ ) or with constant and trend (η τ ). The critical values to 5% for η µ  and η τ  are 0.463 and 0.146, respectively. Four
lags are used to calculate the statistic. *Significant at 5%.- 25 -
Table 4. - Cross Correlation Analysis
Japan Hong Kong Indonesia Malaysia South Korea Philippines Thailand
Precrash 4/1/1995 - 1/7/1997 (653 Obs.)
Hong Kong 0.22
Indonesia 0.05* 0.33
Malaysia 0.17 0.44 0.37
South Korea 0.01* 0.05* 0.02* 0.01*
Philippines 0.08 0.29 0.37 0.32 0.06
Thailand 0.07* 0.28 0.22 0.29 0.01* 0.17
United Kingdom 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.05* 0.06* 0.07*
Eurozone 0.27 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.06* 0.11 0.07*
Latin America 0.08 0.15 0.19 0.14 0.12 0.18 0.08
United States 0.01* 0.08 0.09 0.02* 0.09 0.08 0.01*
United States(-1) 0.18 0.40 0.21 0.24 0.09 0.19 0.11
Postcrash 1/11/1997 - 15/5/2000 (662 Obs.)
Hong Kong 0.35
Indonesia 0.24 0.39
Malaysia 0.28 0.33 0.35
South Korea 0.22 0.24 0.18 0.21
Philippines 0.27 0.43 0.44 0.28 0.26
Thailand 0.31 0.48 0.43 0.39 0.33 0.54
United Kingdom 0.27 0.41 0.13 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.25
Eurozone 0.27 0.37 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.25
Latin America 0.16 0.26 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.21 0.19
United States 0.03* 0.14 0.03* 0.03* 0.07* 0.12 0.07*
United States(-1) 0.21 0.34 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.29 0.22







Precrash - Postcrash %
Hong Kong 62
Indonesia 408 18
Malaysia 61 -26 -8
South Korea 2086 365 787 2036
Philippines 250 50 17 -12 361
Thailand 356 69 97 37 3152 212
United Kingdom 103 171 3 49 347 263 277
Eurozone 0 58 -16 0 167 87 258
Latin America 100 73 -42 7 42 17 138
United States 235 66 -69 34 -21 51 626
United States(-1) 16 -14 -17 -21 135 48 95- 26 -
Table 5. - Multivariate Cointegration Test
The test of multivariate cointegration between the Asian stock markets (Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Indonesia and Thailand) and the
major international stock markets (United States, United Kingdom, Eurozone and Latin America) uses statistics to contrast the null hypothesis (H0) that there are r
cointegration vectors, against the alternative hypothesis (H1) that there exists, at least, r+1 cointegration vectors, where r goes from 0 to 7 and the λ  maximum,
which tests the null hypothesis (H0) that there are, as a maximum, r cointegration vectors against the alternative hypothesis (H1) stating that there are, as a maximum,
r+1cointegration vectors, where r goes from 0 to 7. The series used are the logarithms of the daily closing prices of the indexes of each market, expressed in dollars.
The sample consists of two sub-intervals divided by the Asian crisis. The estimated models have been determined in function of the Schwartz information criteria
(no more than two lags are used). The models incorporate trend in the data and constants in the cointegration equation. The critical values have been taken from the
work of Osterwald-Lenum (1992) -statistics test: 156 (5%) and 168.36 (1%); test of the λ  maximum: 51.42 (5%) and 33.24 (1%).
.
TRACE TEST
4/1/1995 - 1/7/1997 1/11/1997 - 15/5/2000
Hypothesis United States United Kingdom Eurozone Latin America United States United Kingdom Eurozone Latin America
H0 H1
r=0 r>0 139.94 147.50 142.56 149.66 153.87 0.0542 154.38 145.39
r <=1 r>1 95.72 101.18 95.67 101.18 114.95 0.0435 111.59 98.03
r <=2 r>2 66.30 70.14 68.44 64.76 78.31 0.0364 76.31 68.74
r <=3 r>3 45.46 47.29 46.82 54.16 54.16 0.0320 52.98 47.07
r <=4 r>4 27.94 28.20 30.63 33.80 34.52 0.0259 33.12 29.54
r <=5 r>5 13.80 16.42 17.50 18.70 18.46 0.0158 18.59 18.28
r <=6 r>6 5.62 6.90 7.10 7.54 8.05 0.0103 7.31 8.27
r <=7 r>7 1.12 1.31 1.36 0.75 0.69 0.0014 0.63 1.17
TEST λλλλ  MAXIMUM
4/1/1995 - 1/7/1997 1/11/1997 - 15/5/2000
Hypothesis United States United Kingdom Eurozone Latin America United States United Kingdom Eurozone Latin America
H0 H1
r=0 r=1 44.21 46.33 46.89 48.48 38.92 36.92 42.79 47.35
r=1 r=2 29.42 31.04 27.23 36.42 36.64 29.47 35.28 29.29
r=2 r=3 20.84 22.85 21.62 21.48 24.15 24.54 23.33 20.95
r=3 r=4 17.52 19.09 16.19 20.36 19.34 21.22 19.56 17.53
r=4 r=5 14.15 11.79 13.13 15.10 15.82 17.08 14.31 11.25
r=5 r=6 8.17 9.51 10.40 11.15 10.25 10.38 11.11 10.01
r=6 r=7 4.51 5.59 5.74 6.80 7.25 6.74 6.58 7.11
r=7 r=8 1.12 1.31 1.36 0.75 0.68 0.91 0.62 1.17- 27 -
Table 6. - Short-term Bivariant Causality
The sample refers to the daily returns of the market indexes. The lags have been determined according to the Schwarz information criteria and
jointly requiring the non-existence of serial correlation in the residuals. In the first row, the null hypothesis (H0) is shown. F is the value of the
statistic F-Snedecor that tests for short-term causality. “p-value” indicates the minimum level of probability to which the null hypothesis is
accepted. (*) Indicates the rejection of H0 at 1% level.





Indonesiaj Thailandj Japanj South
Koreaj
Philippinesj Malaysiaj Hong Kongj Indonesiaj Thailandj
4/1/1995 - 1/7/1997 (Precrash)
United Statesi
F 13.136(*) 2.118 11.742(*) 19.553(*) 63.924(*) 16.134(*) 4.797(*) 0.675 1.938 1.086 0.989 0.157 2.902 0.924
p-value 0.000 0.121 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.510 0.145 0.338 0.373 0.854 0.056 0.398
United Kingdomi
F 4.209 1.293 2.088 5.453(*) 6.579(*) 2.557 1.105 0.158 1.372 2.297 0.153 5.635(*) 0.316 0.824
p-value 0.015 0.275 0.125 0.004 0.001 0.078 0.332 0.854 0.254 0.101 0.858 0.004 0.729 0.439
Eurozonei
F 3.306 0.349 2.277 1.325 0.952 0.438 0.453 0.083 0.944 0.771 0.042 3.086 0.517 1.186
p-value 0.037 0.706 0.103 0.267 0.387 0.646 0.636 0.921 0.390 0.463 0.959 0.046 0.597 0.306
Latin Anericai
F 4.590 1.683 6.707(*) 7.951(*) 19.740(*) 12.469(*) 1.872 2.859 0.132 1.108 0.326 1.130 0.384 0.181
p-value 0.011 0.187 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.155 0.058 0.876 0.331 0.722 0.324 0.682 0.834
1/11/1997 - 15/5/2000 (Postcrash)
United Statesi
F 16.438(*) 13.718(*) 24.757(*) 11.556(*) 41.998(*) 10.540(*) 16.054(*) 0.488 0.909 0.892 3.175 0.084 2.742 2.658
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.614 0.403 0.410 0.042 0.919 0.065 0.071
United Kingdomi
F 22.222(*) 13.562(*) 26.584(*) 1.108 13.477(*) 6.232(*) 10.789(*) 3.307 0.466 0.326 0.645 0.321 1.566 0.235
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.331 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.037 0.628 0.722 0.525 0.726 0.210 0.791
Eurozonei
F 16.862(*) 12.817(*) 27.796(*) 2.903 6.853(*) 7.754(*) 11.143(*) 4.413 0.380 1.198 2.330 0.817 0.495 0.831
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.684 0.302 0.098 0.442 0.610 0.436
Latin Anericai
F 17.699(*) 11.520(*) 33.360(*) 3.950 24.242(*) 11.807(*) 18.276(*) 1.908 0.076 0.143 0.254 0.709 3.607 0.243
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.149 0.927 0.867 0.776 0.493 0.028 0.785- 28 -
Table 7. - Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
(Asia vs United States)
Each row shows the proportion of the variance of the return Xi that is explained by each of the returns Xj. Each column shows the
explicative capacity of the return Xj in the return Xi. The variable “Rest” shows the percentage of the decomposition of the variance of the
forecast error of Xi explained by the rest of returns Xj . The order of presentation of the returns is not arbitrary, it follows the trading hours
(GMT) of each market.
4/1/1995 - 1/7/1997 1/11/1997 - 15/5/2000
Days Japanj South
Korea j












5 95.958 0.089 0.047 0.573 0.125 0.054 0.030 3.123 4.042 94.183 0.464 0.188 0.596 0.248 0.299 0.033 3.989 5.817
10 95.958 0.089 0.047 0.573 0.125 0.054 0.030 3.123 4.042 94.182 0.464 0.188 0.596 0.248 0.299 0.033 3.989 5.818
South Koreai
5 0.048 99.220 0.003 0.058 0.024 0.038 0.002 0.606 0.780 4.915 89.334 0.377 0.004 1.078 0.010 0.438 3.844 10.666
10 0.048 99.220 0.003 0.058 0.024 0.038 0.002 0.606 0.780 4.915 89.334 0.377 0.004 1.078 0.010 0.438 3.844 10.666
Philippinesi
5 0.322 0.277 90.082 2.811 0.061 1.744 1.050 3.653 9.918 5.445 6.580 72.688 2.368 1.058 3.807 0.533 7.522 27.312
10 0.322 0.277 90.082 2.811 0.061 1.744 1.050 3.653 9.918 5.445 6.580 72.687 2.368 1.058 3.807 0.533 7.522 27.313
Malaysiai
5 1.995 0.086 6.119 84.804 0.870 0.087 0.241 5.798 15.196 5.684 2.380 3.575 84.819 0.266 0.238 0.051 2.988 15.181
10 1.995 0.086 6.119 84.804 0.870 0.087 0.241 5.798 15.196 5.684 2.380 3.575 84.819 0.266 0.238 0.051 2.989 15.181
Hong Kongi
5 3.555 0.074 4.004 9.128 67.500 0.746 0.018 14.974 32.500 7.918 3.481 6.994 2.290 68.078 0.254 0.150 10.833 31.922
10 3.555 0.074 4.004 9.128 67.500 0.746 0.018 14.974 32.500 7.918 3.482 6.994 2.290 68.078 0.254 0.150 10.833 31.922
Indonesiai
5 0.175 0.375 8.932 8.262 1.287 74.809 1.752 4.409 25.191 4.039 5.417 9.532 4.644 2.471 70.934 0.171 2.792 29.066
10 0.175 0.375 8.932 8.262 1.287 74.809 1.752 4.409 25.191 4.039 5.417 9.532 4.644 2.471 70.934 0.171 2.792 29.066
Thailandi
5 0.313 0.257 2.105 4.918 4.341 0.526 86.018 1.522 13.982 8.386 7.586 14.866 3.960 3.544 2.415 55.019 4.225 44.981
10 0.313 0.257 2.105 4.918 4.341 0.526 86.018 1.522 13.982 8.386 7.586 14.866 3.960 3.544 2.415 55.018 4.225 44.982
United Statesi
5 0.159 0.745 0.840 0.022 0.287 1.743 0.411 95.793 4.207 0.085 0.700 0.672 0.790 1.076 0.658 0.151 95.867 4.133
10 0.159 0.745 0.840 0.022 0.287 1.743 0.411 95.793 4.207 0.085 0.700 0.672 0.790 1.076 0.658 0.151 95.867 4.133- 29 -
Table 8.- Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
(Asia vs United Kingdom)
Each row shows the proportion of the variance of the return Xi that is explained by each of the returns Xj. Each column shows the
explicative capacity of the return Xj in the return Xi. The variable “Rest” shows the percentage of the decomposition of the variance of the
forecast error of Xi explained by the rest of returns Xj . The order of presentation of the returns is not arbitrary, it follows the trading hours
(GMT) of each market.
4/1/1995 - 1/7/1997 1/11/1997 - 15/5/2000
Days Japanj South
Korea j












5 97.902 0.100 0.041 0.540 0.158 0.007 0.016 1.235 2.098 93.747 0.539 0.325 0.535 0.239 0.262 0.019 4.335 6.253
10 97.902 0.100 0.041 0.540 0.158 0.007 0.016 1.235 2.098 93.747 0.539 0.325 0.535 0.239 0.262 0.019 4.335 6.253
South Koreai
5 0.040 99.618 0.001 0.067 0.031 0.027 0.001 0.216 0.382 5.192 90.313 0.251 0.012 1.067 0.044 0.453 2.668 9.687
10 0.040 99.618 0.001 0.067 0.031 0.027 0.001 0.216 0.382 5.192 90.313 0.251 0.012 1.067 0.044 0.453 2.668 9.687
Philippinesi
5 0.667 0.323 92.890 2.988 0.094 1.595 1.106 0.337 7.110 5.811 7.259 74.628 2.199 1.071 3.697 0.513 4.820 25.372
10 0.667 0.323 92.889 2.988 0.094 1.595 1.106 0.337 7.111 5.811 7.259 74.628 2.199 1.071 3.697 0.513 4.820 25.372
Malaysiai
5 2.828 0.029 7.563 86.764 1.013 0.015 0.215 1.574 13.236 7.204 3.083 4.640 84.409 0.280 0.181 0.037 0.166 15.591
10 2.828 0.029 7.563 86.764 1.013 0.015 0.215 1.574 13.236 7.204 3.084 4.640 84.409 0.280 0.181 0.037 0.166 15.591
Hong Kongi
5 5.282 0.216 6.315 11.840 73.745 0.506 0.025 2.071 26.255 9.482 4.285 9.061 2.654 70.735 0.149 0.125 3.508 29.265
10 5.282 0.216 6.315 11.840 73.745 0.506 0.025 2.071 26.255 9.482 4.285 9.061 2.654 70.735 0.149 0.125 3.508 29.265
Indonesiai
5 0.330 0.215 10.783 9.381 1.945 75.109 1.790 0.448 24.891 4.624 5.821 10.551 4.596 2.537 70.855 0.158 0.858 29.145
10 0.330 0.215 10.783 9.381 1.945 75.109 1.790 0.448 24.891 4.624 5.821 10.551 4.596 2.537 70.855 0.158 0.858 29.145
Thailandi
5 0.523 0.206 2.607 5.355 4.601 0.467 86.048 0.194 13.952 8.998 8.221 15.941 3.843 3.485 2.364 55.053 2.094 44.947
10 0.523 0.206 2.607 5.355 4.601 0.467 86.048 0.194 13.952 8.998 8.221 15.941 3.843 3.485 2.364 55.053 2.094 44.947
United
Kingdomi
5 1.804 0.549 0.422 1.643 0.611 0.495 0.027 94.449 5.551 7.606 2.852 2.736 1.203 6.801 0.585 0.041 78.176 21.824
10 1.804 0.549 0.422 1.643 0.611 0.495 0.027 94.449 5.551 7.606 2.852 2.736 1.203 6.801 0.585 0.041 78.176 21.824- 30 -
Table 9.- Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
 (Asia vs Eurozone)
Each row shows the proportion of the variance of the return Xi that is explained by each of the returns Xj. Each column shows the
explicative capacity of the return Xj in the return Xi. The variable “Rest” shows the percentage of the decomposition of the variance of the
forecast error of Xi explained by the rest of returns Xj . The order of presentation of the returns is not arbitrary, it follows the trading hours
(GMT) of each market.
4/1/1995 - 1/7/1997 1/11/1997 - 15/5/2000
Days Japanj South
Korea j












5 99.141 0.092 0.037 0.555 0.147 0.005 0.017 0.006 0.859 93.932 0.519 0.297 0.547 0.245 0.257 0.021 4.182 6.068
10 99.141 0.092 0.037 0.555 0.147 0.005 0.017 0.006 0.859 93.932 0.519 0.297 0.547 0.245 0.257 0.021 4.182 6.068
South Koreai
5 0.043 99.626 0.001 0.066 0.035 0.027 0.001 0.201 0.374 5.271 90.548 0.261 0.006 1.075 0.046 0.463 2.331 9.452
10 0.043 99.626 0.001 0.066 0.035 0.027 0.001 0.201 0.374 5.271 90.548 0.261 0.006 1.075 0.046 0.463 2.331 9.452
Philippinesi
5 0.754 0.353 92.986 3.022 0.092 1.591 1.101 0.101 7.014 5.627 7.146 74.152 2.247 1.078 3.720 0.487 5.544 25.848
10 0.754 0.353 92.986 3.022 0.092 1.591 1.101 0.101 7.014 5.627 7.146 74.151 2.247 1.078 3.720 0.487 5.544 25.849
Malaysiai
5 3.258 0.008 7.700 87.430 1.011 0.013 0.216 0.364 12.570 6.715 2.888 4.408 84.954 0.277 0.180 0.028 0.550 15.046
10 3.258 0.008 7.700 87.430 1.011 0.013 0.216 0.364 12.570 6.715 2.888 4.408 84.954 0.277 0.180 0.028 0.550 15.046
Hong Kongi
5 5.844 0.301 6.452 12.299 74.152 0.509 0.017 0.427 25.848 10.300 4.456 9.547 2.499 71.127 0.151 0.114 1.806 28.873
10 5.844 0.301 6.452 12.299 74.152 0.509 0.017 0.427 25.848 10.300 4.456 9.547 2.499 71.127 0.151 0.114 1.806 28.873
Indonesiai
5 0.387 0.194 10.921 9.616 2.014 75.069 1.785 0.015 24.931 4.375 5.760 10.225 4.681 2.498 70.913 0.146 1.402 29.087
10 0.387 0.194 10.921 9.616 2.014 75.069 1.785 0.015 24.931 4.375 5.760 10.225 4.681 2.498 70.913 0.146 1.402 29.087
Thailandi
5 0.591 0.198 2.642 5.444 4.620 0.456 86.030 0.019 13.970 8.888 8.157 15.771 3.885 3.450 2.384 55.057 2.408 44.943
10 0.591 0.198 2.642 5.444 4.620 0.456 86.030 0.019 13.970 8.888 8.157 15.771 3.885 3.450 2.384 55.057 2.408 44.943
Eurozonei
5 7.590 0.472 1.025 1.149 2.068 1.217 0.031 86.448 13.553 7.119 1.585 1.943 0.393 5.709 0.084 0.389 82.779 17.221
10 7.590 0.472 1.025 1.149 2.068 1.217 0.031 86.448 13.553 7.119 1.585 1.943 0.393 5.709 0.084 0.389 82.779 17.221- 31 -
Table 10.- Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
 (Asia vs Latin America)
Each row shows the proportion of the variance of the return Xi that is explained by each of the returns Xj. Each column shows the
explicative capacity of the return Xj in the return Xi. The variable “Rest” shows the percentage of the decomposition of the variance of the
forecast error of Xi explained by the rest of returns Xj . The order of presentation of the returns is not arbitrary, it follows the trading hours
(GMT) of each market.
4/1/1995 - 1/7/1997 1/11/1997 - 15/5/2000
Days Japanj South
Korea j












5 96.632 0.209 0.177 1.133 0.200 0.099 0.007 1.543 3.368 94.288 0.421 0.191 0.580 0.237 0.306 0.029 3.948 5.712
10 96.632 0.209 0.177 1.133 0.200 0.099 0.007 1.543 3.368 94.288 0.421 0.191 0.580 0.237 0.306 0.029 3.948 5.712
South Koreai
5 0.387 98.983 0.021 0.002 0.034 0.003 0.091 0.481 1.017 5.145 90.187 0.374 0.004 1.056 0.004 0.416 2.815 9.813
10 0.387 98.983 0.021 0.002 0.034 0.003 0.091 0.481 1.018 5.145 90.186 0.374 0.004 1.056 0.004 0.416 2.815 9.814
Philippinesi
5 0.350 0.279 92.304 2.419 0.069 0.739 1.591 2.249 7.696 5.545 6.304 72.373 2.348 0.989 4.076 0.439 7.927 27.627
10 0.350 0.279 92.302 2.419 0.069 0.739 1.591 2.250 7.698 5.544 6.304 72.373 2.348 0.989 4.076 0.439 7.927 27.627
Malaysiai
5 2.037 0.088 4.135 90.497 0.005 0.121 0.137 2.980 9.503 6.594 2.760 4.204 85.022 0.264 0.242 0.036 0.877 14.978
10 2.037 0.088 4.135 90.497 0.005 0.121 0.137 2.980 9.503 6.594 2.760 4.204 85.022 0.264 0.242 0.036 0.877 14.978
Hong Kongi
5 3.928 0.486 4.312 5.470 78.326 1.178 0.022 6.278 21.674 9.065 3.761 7.971 2.634 70.265 0.323 0.094 5.888 29.735
10 3.928 0.486 4.312 5.470 78.326 1.178 0.022 6.278 21.674 9.065 3.761 7.971 2.634 70.265 0.323 0.094 5.888 29.735
Indonesiai
5 0.258 0.350 8.403 5.930 1.927 77.132 1.936 4.065 22.868 4.190 5.369 9.660 4.732 2.412 71.020 0.135 2.483 28.980
10 0.258 0.350 8.403 5.930 1.927 77.130 1.936 4.066 22.870 4.190 5.369 9.660 4.732 2.412 71.020 0.135 2.483 28.980
Thailandi
5 0.626 0.019 0.830 2.893 5.027 0.397 89.807 0.403 10.193 8.370 7.430 14.624 3.960 3.321 2.550 55.090 4.655 44.910
10 0.626 0.019 0.830 2.893 5.027 0.397 89.807 0.403 10.193 8.370 7.430 14.624 3.960 3.321 2.550 55.090 4.655 44.910
Latin Americai
5 1.083 1.118 2.281 0.442 0.176 1.288 0.168 93.444 6.556 2.026 1.391 1.447 0.554 2.171 1.286 0.008 91.116 8.884
10 1.083 1.118 2.281 0.442 0.176 1.288 0.168 93.444 6.556 2.026 1.391 1.447 0.554 2.171 1.286 0.008 91.116 8.884- 32 -
Graph 1.- Response of the United States to one standard error shock
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Graph 2.- Response of the Asian markets to one standard error
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Graph 3.- Response of the United Kingdom to one standard error
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Hong Kong Indonesia Thailand- 34 -
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Graph 6.- Response of the Asian markets to one standard error
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Graph 7.- Response of the Latin American markets to one standard
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Graph 8.- Response of the Asian markets to one standard error
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